USCA11 Case: 21-12355

Date Filed: 11/15/2021

Page: 1 of 37

No. 21-12355
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

NetChoice LLC, et al.,
Plaintiffs–Appellees,
v.
Attorney General, State of Florida, et al.,
Defendants–Appellants.

On appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Florida — No. 4:21-cv-00220-RH-MAF

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE THE KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT
INSTITUTE AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS–APPELLEES

Scott Wilkens
Alex Abdo
Jameel Jaffer
Knight First Amendment Institute at
Columbia University
475 Riverside Drive, Suite 302
New York, NY 10115
(646) 745-8500
scott.wilkens@knightcolumbia.org
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

USCA11 Case: 21-12355

Date Filed: 11/15/2021

Page: 2 of 37

No. 21-12355, NetChoice LLC, et al. v. Attorney General, State of Florida, et al.
Certificate of Interested Persons and Corporate Disclosure Statement
Pursuant to 11th Cir. R. 26.1-1, amicus, a not-for-profit corporation, states
that it has no parent corporation and that no publicly held corporation owns 10
percent or more of its stock.
Amicus also certifies that, pursuant to 11th Cir. R. 26.1-1, 28-1, and 29-2,
other than amicus and its attorneys listed below, there are no trial judges, attorneys,
persons, associations of persons, firms, partnerships, or corporations that have an
interest in the outcome of this particular case on appeal that were omitted from
Defendants-Appellants’ certificate.
• Abdo, Alex, Attorney for Amicus Curiae
• Jaffer, Jameel, Attorney for Amicus Curiae
• Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University
• Wilkens, Scott, Attorney for Amicus Curiae
/s/ Scott Wilkens
Scott Wilkens
Counsel for Amicus Curiae

CIP-1 of 1

USCA11 Case: 21-12355

Date Filed: 11/15/2021

Page: 3 of 37

Table of Contents
Table of Authorities .................................................................................................. ii
Interests of Amicus Curiae ........................................................................................1
Statement of the Issues ..............................................................................................2
Summary of the Argument ........................................................................................2
Argument ...................................................................................................................4
I.

Senate Bill 7072 is unconstitutional because it discriminates
among social media platforms on the basis of viewpoint. .........................4

II.

The Court should reject a construction of the First Amendment that
would disable the government from enacting legislation that serves
First Amendment values. ...........................................................................6
A.

The First Amendment protects the exercise of editorial
judgment. ........................................................................................ 7

B.

Some of what social media platforms do reflects the exercise
of editorial judgment—but not all of it does. ................................ 11

C.

Some laws that implicate editorial judgment are consistent
with the First Amendment. ........................................................... 14

D.

The analogy of social media companies to newspapers is
helpful only to a point. .................................................................. 18

E.

Construing platforms’ rights too broadly would impede
government from enacting laws that would serve First
Amendment values. ...................................................................... 23

Conclusion ...............................................................................................................28
Certificate of Compliance ........................................................................................29
Certificate of Service ...............................................................................................30

i

USCA11 Case: 21-12355

Date Filed: 11/15/2021

Page: 4 of 37

Table of Authorities
Cases
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) ....................................................... 27
Ark. Educ. Television Com’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) ............................... 12
Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) ................................... 5
Ashcroft v. Am. C.L. Union, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) .................................................. 18
Assoc. Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) ..................................................... 13, 14
Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220
(2021) ................................................................................................................ 14
Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011).................................................. 5
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973) .................................................................................................................. 8
*Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515
U.S. 557 (1995) ................................................................................... 6, 9, 10, 20
Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019)............................................................... 14
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991) ............................................................... 6
*Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) .................. 7, 8, 11, 13
*Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1
(1986) ........................................................................................................ 8, 9, 15
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015) ......................................................... 6
Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) ............................................ 18
*Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) .............................. 9, 16, 17
*Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) ............................ 15, 17, 18

ii

USCA11 Case: 21-12355

Date Filed: 11/15/2021

Page: 5 of 37

U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016) .................................. 14
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) ........................................................... 27
Statutes
2021 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2021-32.................................................................... 5
47 U.S.C. § 230 ...................................................................................................... 20
Fla. Stat. § 501 .......................................................................................................... 4
Other Authorities
Anna Kramer, Twitter’s own research shows that it’s a megaphone
for the right. But it’s complicated, Protocol (Oct. 21, 2021),
https://perma.cc/4BZT-CKW4 .................................................................... 22, 24
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Do Platforms Have Editorial Rights?, 1 J. Free
Speech L. 97 (2021) .......................................................................................... 26
Charlie Savage, Facebook Is Asked to Change Rules for Journalists
and Scholars, N.Y. Times (Aug. 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/BP3MU4CN ................................................................................................................. 24
Deepa Seetharaman, The Facebook Files: Facebook Says AI Will
Clean Up the Platform. Its Own Engineers Have Doubts, Wall
Street Journal (Oct. 17, 2021), https://perma.cc/PCM8-BJD8 .......................... 22
Eugene Volokh, Treating Social Media Like Common Carriers?, 1 J.
Free Speech L. 377 (2021) .............................................................. 12, 14, 20, 26
Farhad Manjoo, Opinion: OK, but What Should We Actually Do About
Facebook? I Asked the Experts, N.Y. Times (Nov. 4, 2021),
https://perma.cc/3GSD-WB72........................................................................... 27
Genevieve Lakier, The Problem Isn’t the Use of Analogies but the
Analogies Courts Use, Knight First Amendment Institute at
Columbia University Blog (Feb. 26, 2018),
https://perma.cc/WDT7-EY4J ........................................................................... 21

iii

USCA11 Case: 21-12355

Date Filed: 11/15/2021

Page: 6 of 37

Heather Whitney, Search Engines, Social Media, and the Editorial
Analogy, Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia
University (Feb. 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/C4DY-4W7G ....................... 18, 23
Jack M. Balkin, How to Regulate (and Not Regulate) Social Media, 1
J. Free Speech L. 71 (2021) ......................................................................... 11, 26
Jameel Jaffer & Katy Glenn Bass, Opinion, Facebook’s ‘Supreme
Court’ Faces Its First Major Test, N.Y. Times (Feb. 17, 2021),
https://perma.cc/27K9-LPS2 ............................................................................. 24
John Koetsier, Report: Facebook Makes 300,000 Content Moderation
Mistakes Every Day, Forbes (June 9, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkoetsier/2020/06/09/300000facebook-content-moderation-mistakes-daily-reportsays/?sh=d3fdd854d03d .................................................................................... 21
Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes
Governing Online Speech, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1598 (2018) .............................. 19
Laura Edelson, Opinion, How Facebook Hinders Misinformation
Research, Scientific American (Sept. 22, 2021),
https://perma.cc/6V2Y-AGQ8........................................................................... 24
Lawrence Lessig, The First Amendment Does Not Protect Replicants,
Harv. Public Law Working Paper No. 21-34 (September 10, 2021),
https://perma.cc/B29P-ATS2 ............................................................................ 22
Mailyn Fidler, The New Editors: Refining First Amendment
Protections for Internet Platforms, 2 Notre Dame L. Sch. J. on
Emerging Tech. 241 (2021) ............................................................................... 13
Meta, Who We Are: Company Info, https://perma.cc/2WFD-Z9KV ..................... 19
Natasha Singer, What You Don’t Know About How Facebook Uses
Your Data, N.Y. Times (April 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/3CJ6HFF3 .................................................................................................................. 26
Oren Bracha, The Folklore of Informationalism: The Case of Search
Engine Speech, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 1629 (2014) ...................................... 20, 21

iv

USCA11 Case: 21-12355

Date Filed: 11/15/2021

Page: 7 of 37

Oversight Board, Oversight Board demands more transparency from
Facebook (Oct. 2021), https://perma.cc/T4N7-R98K ....................................... 25
Ramya Krishnan & Alex Abdo, How Do You Solve A Problem Like
Facebook?, Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia
University Blog (Oct. 14, 2021), https://perma.cc/MAG5-RJEJ ...................... 25
Ramya Krishnan, The Pitfalls of Platform Analogies in Reconsidering
the Shape of the First Amendment, Knight First Amendment
Institute at Columbia University Blog (May 19, 2021),
https://perma.cc/QHD8-7JLS ............................................................................ 21
Robinson Meyer, How Many Stories Do Newspapers Publish Per
Day? The Atlantic (May 26, 2016), https://perma.cc/Q6TQ-GEHE ................ 19
Rogene Jacquette, We Stand Corrected: How The Times Handles
Errors, N.Y. Times (June 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/VY25-P5RP ................... 21
Shirin Ghaffary, How to fix Facebook: Can Facebook be redeemed?
Twelve leading experts share bold solutions to the company’s
urgent problems, Vox (Nov. 8, 2021), https://perma.cc/YA54NZG7 ................................................................................................................. 24
The Disinformation Black Box: Researching Social Media Data:
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of
the H. Comm. Sci., Space, and Tech. (2021) (statement of Laura
Edelson, NYU Cybersecurity for Democracy),
https://science.house.gov/imo/media/doc/Edelson%20Testimony.pdf ............. 24
Yoel Roth & Nick Pickles, Updating our approach to misleading
information, Twitter Blog (May 11, 2020), https://perma.cc/9JJ7JDBM ................................................................................................................ 12

v

USCA11 Case: 21-12355

Date Filed: 11/15/2021

Page: 8 of 37

Interests of Amicus Curiae
The Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University (“Knight
Institute” or “Institute”) is a non-partisan, not-for-profit organization that works to
defend the freedoms of speech and the press in the digital age through strategic
litigation, research, and public education. The Institute’s aim is to promote a system
of free expression that is open and inclusive, that broadens and elevates public
discourse, and that fosters creativity, accountability, and effective self-government.
Amicus has a particular interest in this case because of the vital role social
media platforms play as forums for public discourse. The statute challenged here is
the first state law that seeks to constrain social media companies’ power to moderate
speech on their platforms. The case may have far-reaching implications for the free
speech rights of the platforms and their users, and for the ability of government to
enact legislation essential to ensuring that the digital public sphere serves
democracy.1

1

No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part. No party or party’s
counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the
brief. No person other than amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel contributed
money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief. The parties have
consented to the filing of this amicus brief.
1
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Statement of the Issues
Whether the district court correctly enjoined S.B. 7072 because, among other
things, Plaintiffs established a likelihood of success on the merits of their First
Amendment claim.
Summary of the Argument
S.B. 7072 (the “Act”) is unconstitutional because it is designed to punish
certain social media companies, selected on the basis of perceived viewpoint, for
their exercise of rights protected by the First Amendment. The Court can resolve this
case on this narrow and straightforward basis.
Both the parties and some of their amici, however, have made further-reaching
arguments about the application of the First Amendment to social media platforms.
Florida’s brief suggests that the Act does not implicate the First Amendment at all,
because the platforms do not engage in protected expression when they moderate or
curate user content, and because the platforms should be viewed as common carriers.
Plaintiffs’ brief, by contrast, construes platforms’ First Amendment rights in the
broadest way, suggesting that any regulation that burdens their exercise of First
Amendment rights should be subject to strict scrutiny, and perhaps even viewed as
per se unconstitutional. In the court below, some amici advanced similar arguments.
Thus, the parties and some amici have offered two theories of the First Amendment,
one that would render the First Amendment largely irrelevant to the question of how

2
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governments should regulate social media, and another that would make it nearly
impossible for governments to enact even carefully drawn laws intended to ensure
that the digital public sphere serves democracy.
As this brief explains, the courts need not choose between “all” or “nothing”
in this sphere. Whether a particular activity is covered by the First Amendment in
this context turns on whether the activity entails the exercise of “editorial judgment.”
This label applies to some of the platforms’ activities, but it may not apply to others.
Perhaps more important, even activities covered by the First Amendment can
sometimes be regulated. Whether any particular regulation should be subject to
intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny will turn on the nature of the regulation, and
the mere fact that a regulation implicates editorial judgment does not mean the
regulation is unconstitutional. Plaintiffs and some of their amici analogize social
media platforms to newspapers—and this analogy is useful, to a point. But social
media platforms and newspapers are different in important respects, and these
differences should matter to the First Amendment analysis, as explained below.
If the Court addresses the parties’ further-reaching arguments about the
application of the First Amendment to social media platforms, it should reject both
Florida’s theory of the First Amendment (the “nothing” theory) and Plaintiffs’
theory (the “all” theory). It should reject these theories because they are inconsistent
with controlling caselaw, but also because neither of them would serve First

3
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Amendment values well in the digital age. Florida’s version of the First Amendment
would give the government sweeping authority over the digital public sphere and
impede social media companies from addressing real harms online. Plaintiffs’ theory
would make it difficult or impossible for governments to enact even carefully drawn
laws intended to protect the free speech, due process, and privacy rights of platforms’
users and to ensure that our system of free expression serves democracy. Neither of
these theories is defensible, and the Court should reject both of them.
Argument
I.

Senate Bill 7072 is unconstitutional because it discriminates among
social media platforms on the basis of viewpoint.
As discussed further below, platforms engage in protected expression when

they specify “community standards” that restrict what categories of content users
can post, and when they remove or attach warning labels to user content. See Part
II.B infra. The Act is unconstitutional because it is designed to punish certain social
media companies, selected on the basis of perceived viewpoint, for expression
protected by the First Amendment.
That the Act is intended to achieve this end is made evident in a variety of
ways. Perhaps most notably, the statutory definition of “social media platform,”
which is a lynchpin, applies only to a subset of the largest social media companies,
expressly excluding any such company under common ownership with a Florida
theme park, an obvious reference to Disney. Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(1)(g). A statute
4
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should not necessarily trigger strict scrutiny merely because it regulates only the
largest companies—there are obvious reasons why legislatures might legitimately
focus on the companies with the most influence over public discourse. Here,
however, the definition of “social media platform” appears to have been
gerrymandered to ensure that the Act’s burdens fall principally on platforms
believed to have a liberal bias (e.g., Twitter and Facebook), and not on smaller
platforms believed to have a conservative one (e.g., Parler and Gab), and not on
Disney, which is not perceived to have a liberal bias and also has significant
operations in Florida.
As a result, the Act is underinclusive in reference to its declared purpose. The
Act states that it is intended to prevent platforms from “unfairly censor[ing], shadow
bann[ing], deplatform[ing], and appl[ying] post-prioritization algorithms to
Floridians.” 2021 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2021-32 (S.B. 7072) (West). But the Act
does not actually take aim at all social media platforms. The Act’s
underinclusiveness “raises serious doubts about whether the government is in fact
pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than disfavoring a particular speaker or
viewpoint.” Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 802 (2011). Even
“where . . . there is no evidence of an improper censorial motive,” Ark. Writers’
Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1987), a law is subject to strict scrutiny

5
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if it is “structured so as to raise suspicion that it was intended to [interfere with
protected speech].” Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448 (1991).
The legislative history—detailed by Plaintiffs and the district court—confirms
that the Act is indeed designed to punish social media platforms believed, rightly or
wrongly, to have a liberal bias. Pls. Br. at 15; App. 1719-20. The Act therefore is
permissible under the First Amendment only if it satisfies strict scrutiny. Reed v.
Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015). It cannot survive this review. Indeed,
Florida has not even asserted that the Act serves a compelling governmental purpose.
If its purpose here is to eliminate the liberal bias of social media platforms, that is a
“decidedly fatal” objective. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of
Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 579 (1995) (“produc[ing] speakers free of … biases” toward
“certain classes” is not a legitimate government interest). Moreover, the Act’s underinclusiveness means the Act is not narrowly tailored to even that interest. For these
reasons, the Act fails strict scrutiny.2
II.

The Court should reject a construction of the First Amendment that
would disable the government from enacting legislation that serves First
Amendment values.
The Court can dispose of this case on the narrow ground described above. In

their briefs, however, the parties advance broader arguments about the application

2

Amicus takes no position here on whether S.B. 7072 is preempted by Section
230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230.
6
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of the First Amendment to social media. Florida’s brief suggests that the Act does
not implicate the First Amendment at all, because the platforms do not engage in
protected expression when they moderate or curate user content, and because the
platforms should be viewed as common carriers. Plaintiffs’ brief, by contrast,
construes platforms’ First Amendment rights in the broadest manner, suggesting that
any regulation that burdens their exercise of First Amendment rights should be
subject to strict scrutiny. If the Court addresses these arguments, it should reject
them.
A.

The First Amendment protects the exercise of editorial judgment.

In an important series of cases, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
First Amendment protects the exercise of “editorial judgment.” In Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), the Court invalidated a statute
requiring newspapers that criticized political candidates to afford those candidates
an opportunity to reply, in the newspapers’ own pages, free of charge and with equal
prominence and space. 418 U.S. at 244 & n.2. The Court concluded that the statute
“intru[ded] into the function of editors” by compelling them “to publish that which
‘reason’ tells them should not be published.” Id. at 257-58.
Observing that “[a] newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit
for news, comment, and advertising,” the Court held that “[t]he choice of material
to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and

7
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content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials—whether
fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment.” Id. at 258.
In his concurrence, Justice White underscored that “the very nerve center of a
newspaper,” is “the decision as to what copy will or will not be included,” and that
the First Amendment prohibits the government from dictating “the contents of [a
newspaper’s] news columns or the slant of its editorials.” Id. at 259-61 (White, J.,
concurring); see also Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 124 (1973) (“editing is what editors are for; and editing is selection and
choice of material”).
Since Tornillo, the Court has held that the First Amendment protects the
exercise of editorial judgment in other contexts, and by other kinds of actors. For
example, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California,
475 U.S. 1 (1986), the Court considered a state rule that required a public utility to
include a third party’s opposing views in the utility’s billing envelopes. Id. at 5-7.3
The state imposed the rule after finding that the utility’s customers “‘will benefit . . .
from exposure to a variety of views.’” Id. at 6 (quoting public utilities commission).
The Court invalidated the rule, however, concluding that it impermissibly interfered
with the utility’s editorial judgment by requiring it to disseminate views opposed to

3

The billing envelopes already included the utility’s own newsletter, which the
Court treated as equivalent to a small newspaper. Id. at 5, 8.
8
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its own, which in turn forced the utility to respond in order to counter those views
and avoid any impression that the utility agreed with them. Id. at 14-16. As the Court
made clear, “[t]hat kind of forced response is antithetical to the free discussion that
the First Amendment seeks to foster.” Id. at 16.
In Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 661
(1994), the Court considered must-carry provisions that required cable operators to
carry a set number of local broadcast stations. Congress enacted the provisions in
order to “correct [a] competitive imbalance” between cable and broadcast television
that was “endangering the ability of over-the-air broadcast television stations to
compete for a viewing audience and thus for necessary operating revenues.” Id. at
633. Invoking Tornillo, the Court held that a cable operator “exercis[es] editorial
discretion over which stations or programs to include in its repertoire.” Id. at 636.
While the Court ultimately upheld the must-carry provisions, as discussed further
below, it did so only after recognizing that the “provisions interfere[d] with cable
operators’ editorial discretion by compelling them to offer carriage to a certain
minimum number of broadcast stations.” Id. at 643-44.
The Supreme Court’s nearly contemporaneous decision in Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995),
conferred First Amendment protection on yet another form of editorial judgment. In
Hurley, a gay rights group challenged its exclusion from a parade under the state

9
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court’s interpretation of Massachusetts’ public accommodations law. Id. at 566.
There was no dispute that gays and lesbians could participate in the parade as
members of individual parade units. Id. at 572. The dispute arose because the state
court applied the public accommodations law to require that the gay rights group be
admitted “as its own parade unit carrying its own banner.” Id.
The Court held that the parade organizer exercised editorial judgment in
excluding the gay rights group, likening the organizer’s selection of participants to
a newspaper’s selection of news stories and editorials. Id. at 570. The participation
of the gay rights group in the parade, the Court reasoned, would signify the parade
organizer’s endorsement of the group’s message, which would alter the parade’s
expressive content and thus the organizer’s own message to parade spectators. Id. at
572-75. Invoking Tornillo and Pacific Gas, the Court explained that “when
dissemination of a view contrary to one’s own is forced upon a speaker intimately
connected with the communication advanced, the speaker’s right to autonomy over
the message is compromised.” Id. at 576.
The protection that the Court conferred on editorial judgment in Tornillo,
Pacific Gas, Turner, and Hurley is vital for more than one reason. Protecting
editorial discretion in these contexts was a way of recognizing and affirming
speakers’ autonomy by giving them control over their message. It was also a way of
protecting public discourse from government intervention that might have distorted

10
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democratic self-governance. The regulated entities in these cases were disseminating
protected expression to broad audiences, and thus were playing an essential role in
the marketplace of ideas. Protecting editorial discretion in these contexts served
interests that are at the heart of the First Amendment.
B.

Some of what social media platforms do reflects the exercise of
editorial judgment—but not all of it does.

Social media companies exercise editorial discretion in at least two contexts—
when they specify “community standards” that restrict what categories of content
users can post; and when they remove or attach warning labels to user content.
When social media companies specify community standards, they make
decisions roughly analogous to the ones the Supreme Court held to be protected in
Turner, Hurley, and Pacific Gas. They decide what categories of content will appear
on their platforms and what categories will not. Their decisions reflect judgments
about the relative value of those categories of content. And collectively, these
decisions determine the expressive character of the product they provide to their
users.4 In Tornillo, the Court observed that “[t]he choice of material to go into a
newspaper” is at the core of editorial judgment. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258; see also

4

See Jack M. Balkin, How to Regulate (and Not Regulate) Social Media, 1 J. Free
Speech L. 71, 76 (2021) (observing that social media platforms, like twentiethcentury mass media, “set boundaries on permissible content” and thereby “curate
public discourse”).
11
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id. at 259 (“the decision as to what copy will or will not be included” is “the very
nerve center of a newspaper”) (White, J., concurring); Ark. Educ. Television Com’n
v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to
broadcaster’s exclusion of political candidate from debate because excluding
candidate was in “the nature of editorial discretion”). Here, too, decisions about what
content to include or exclude are properly characterized as editorial in nature.
Social media platforms’ attachment of labels to third-party content also
reflects the exercise of editorial judgment. Platforms deploy these labels for a variety
of reasons, including to alert users to content that may be disturbing and to flag
content that platforms believe to be misleading or false.5 Whereas most content
posted on social media platforms is generated by users, labels are distinctive in that
they are generated by the platforms themselves.6 They are roughly analogous to
newspaper editorials, in which newspapers speak directly to matters of public
concern. As such, they fall comfortably within the scope of “editorial judgment” as
the Supreme Court has defined the concept. As the Court made clear in Tornillo,
editorial judgment encompasses the “treatment of public issues,” which the

5

Yoel Roth & Nick Pickles, Updating our approach to misleading information,
Twitter Blog (May 11, 2020), https://perma.cc/9JJ7-JDBM.
6

E.g., Eugene Volokh, Treating Social Media Like Common Carriers?, 1 J. Free
Speech L. 377, 433 (2021) (acknowledging that “posting fact-checks or warnings”
is platform speech).
12
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attachment of warning labels generally is. 418 U.S. at 258. And attaching labels to
content also reflects decisions about the value of the speech to which the labels are
attached, just as specifying community standards does. Even if the attachment of a
warning label did not entail the exercise of editorial judgment, it would still
constitute speech protected by the First Amendment, for the same reasons that an
editorial constitutes speech.
That social media companies’ exercise editorial judgment in these two
contexts does not mean, of course, that all of their business practices fall within the
scope of the First Amendment. The relevant inquiry is not whether a regulated entity
exercises editorial judgment in some context, or even as a general matter, but
whether the entity exercises editorial judgment in the specific context addressed by
the regulation.7 Although the case was decided decades before Tornillo, the Supreme
Court said essentially this in Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937). There,
the Court upheld a National Labor Relations Board order directing the Associated
Press (“AP”) to reinstate an editor fired for his union activity. 301 U.S. at 124. The
Court rejected the argument that the AP was “immune from regulation because it is
an agency of the press.” Id. at 131. “The publisher of a newspaper has no special

7

Mailyn Fidler, The New Editors: Refining First Amendment Protections for
Internet Platforms, 2 Notre Dame L. Sch. J. on Emerging Tech. 241, 243 (2021)
(“The fact that an internet platform exercises [editorial judgment] at one moment or
on one part of its site does not mean it does so in all instances.”).
13
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immunity from the application of general laws,” the Court wrote, and “has no special
privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others.” Id. at 132-33. The Court
emphasized that the NLRB’s order did not in any way limit the AP’s freedom to
publish the news as it saw fit, or to enforce editorial policies, such as by firing editors
who violated those policies. Id. at 133.8
C.

Some laws that implicate editorial judgment are consistent with
the First Amendment.

As discussed above, some of the platforms’ activities entail editorial
judgment. Even regulations that implicate editorial judgment, however, can be
constitutional in some contexts. Content-based regulations will be constitutional if
they satisfy strict scrutiny. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2304 (2019) (“even

8

The First Amendment also poses no impediment to the regulation of common
carriers. Such regulation does not implicate the First Amendment because it
concerns only the “neutral transmission of others’ speech, not a carrier’s
communication of its own message.” U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 740
(D.C. Cir. 2016).
One prominent First Amendment scholar has suggested that platforms may be
regulated as common carriers when they host content, but not when they curate
content, such as the content that platforms arrange in users’ feeds (e.g., Facebook’s
News Feed). Volokh, supra at 408-09. He argues that hosting content does not
implicate platforms’ First Amendment rights but that curating content does. Id.
Whatever arguments the Court addresses in this case, the Court need not address this
one. The provisions of the Act concerning user content regulate the full range of
content curation, not only hosting. In addition, the Act is not a conventional common
carrier regulation because it lacks “a general requirement to serve all comers.” Biden
v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1222 (2021) (Mem.)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
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when we consider a regulation . . . that is subject to ‘strict scrutiny,’ we sometimes
find the regulation to be constitutional after weighing the competing interests
involved.”). And content-neutral laws will be constitutional if they satisfy
intermediate scrutiny. Content-neutral laws are reviewed less stringently because
they “do not pose the same inherent dangers to free expression, and thus are subject
to a less rigorous analysis, which affords the Government latitude in designing a
regulatory solution.” Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 213
(1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Tornillo, Pacific Gas, and Hurley show that content-based laws that interfere
with editorial judgment are subject to strict scrutiny. The right-of-reply statute in
Tornillo was content-based because it “was triggered by a particular category of
newspaper speech,” and awarded access “only to those who disagreed with the
newspaper’s views.” Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 13. Although the forced-access rule in
Pacific Gas was not triggered by any speech of the utility, the Court found that it
was nonetheless content-based because it provided access only to a third party with
opposing views. Id. at 12-14. The Court in Hurley did not expressly state that it was
applying strict scrutiny, but it suggested as much by emphasizing that the parade
organizer, like the newspaper in Tornillo and the utility in Pacific Gas, was forced
to “disseminat[e] a view contrary to [its] own,” which “compromised” its “right to
autonomy over [its] message.” Id. at 576.
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In Turner, by contrast, the Court applied only intermediate scrutiny because
it concluded that the challenged provisions were content-neutral. In that case, again,
the Supreme Court considered provisions that required cable operators to carry local
broadcast stations. The Court concluded that the provisions burdened the cable
operators’ exercise of editorial judgment but upheld them anyway. It did so after
concluding that the “overriding objective … was not to favor programming of a
particular subject matter, viewpoint, or format, but rather to preserve access to free
television programming for the 40 percent of Americans without cable.” Turner I,
512 U.S. at 646.
The Court expressly rejected the cable operators’ argument that Tornillo and
Pacific Gas required strict scrutiny because the must-carry provisions compelled the
“operators to transmit speech not of their choosing.” Id. at 653. The Court explained
that the must-carry provisions were content-neutral, unlike the regulations at issue
in Tornillo and Pacific Gas, because they were not triggered “by any particular
message spoken by cable operators,” and they were not an attempt to
“counterbalance the messages” of the regulated entity. Id. at 655. The Court also
noted that cable operators would not need to alter their own messages to disavow the
content of broadcasts, because cable operators’ subscribers would not associate
those companies with the content of broadcast channels in the first place. Id.
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In distinguishing Tornillo and Pacific Gas, the Court also emphasized a key
technological difference between newspapers and cable television. Unlike
newspapers, the Court noted, cable had “bottleneck, or gatekeeper, control” over the
content delivered to subscribers by virtue of “the physical connection between the
television set and the cable network.” Id. at 656. Because this “bottleneck monopoly
power . . . over a central avenue of communication” could be abused, the Court
concluded that the First Amendment does not prevent the government from “tak[ing]
steps to ensure . . . the free flow of information and ideas.” Id. at 657, 661.
Having concluded that the must-carry provisions were content-neutral, the
Court applied intermediate scrutiny and upheld the provisions. Turner II, 520 U.S.
180. The Court found that the provisions were “designed to address a real harm”—
the likelihood that the 40 percent of Americans without cable would be deprived of
access to broadcast television. Id. at 195. These households relied on over-the-air
broadcast stations as their sole source of television programming, and competition
from the cable industry—including cable operators’ decisions to drop broadcast
stations from their repertoire—threatened broadcasters’ continued access to an
audience and advertising revenues, and thus threatened their very existence. Id. at
190-213. The Court found that the must-carry provisions alleviated this harm
because the provisions “ensured that a number of local broadcasters retain[ed] cable
carriage, with the concomitant audience access and advertising revenues needed to
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support a multiplicity of stations.” Id. at 213. As to narrow tailoring, the Court found
that Congress took steps to lessen the must-carry provisions’ burden on cable
operators, and concluded that “the burden imposed by must-carry is congruent to the
benefits it affords.” Id. at 215-16.
D.

The analogy of social media companies to newspapers is helpful
only to a point.

Social media platforms are like newspapers in that some of their activities
involve the exercise of editorial judgment. But social media platforms are different
from newspapers in important ways. In any particular context, those differences
might matter to whether a particular activity entails the exercise of editorial
judgment, how significantly a regulation burdens that judgment, and the strength of
the government’s interest in imposing the burden.9 As the Supreme Court has
emphasized, “each medium of expression . . . must be assessed for First Amendment
purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its own problems.” Se.
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975); Ashcroft v. Am. C.L. Union,
535 U.S. 564, 595 (2002) (“The economics and the technology of each medium
affect both the burden of a speech restriction and the Government’s interest in
maintaining it.”).

9

See generally Heather Whitney, Search Engines, Social Media, and the Editorial
Analogy, Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University (Feb. 27, 2018),
https://perma.cc/C4DY-4W7G.
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Social media platforms differ from newspapers in the following ways, among
others:
First, whereas newspapers are comprised mainly of content they themselves
create or specifically solicit, most content posted on social media platforms is
generated by the platforms’ users.10 Newspapers are highly selective in what they
publish; they exercise close curatorial control over their pages. Social media
companies have community standards that place broad limits on what content can
be published on their platforms, but within these limits—and to a significant extent
outside them due to imperfect enforcement—they publish virtually everything that
users submit to them. All of this means that newspapers are directly and intimately
engaged with the content they publish in a way that social media platforms are not.
Second, there is an incredible disparity in scale between newspapers and
social media platforms. The New York Times online edition “publishes roughly 150
articles a day.”11 Over the same period, Facebook users share more than 1 billion
stories and 100 billion messages.12 This disparity exists because platforms and
newspapers have different business models; because to some extent they use

10

Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes
Governing Online Speech, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1598, 1660 (2018).
11

Robinson Meyer, How Many Stories Do Newspapers Publish Per Day? The
Atlantic (May 26, 2016), https://perma.cc/Q6TQ-GEHE.
12

Meta, Who We Are: Company Info, https://perma.cc/2WFD-Z9KV.
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different media; and because they operate under different legal regimes (or, perhaps
more accurately, because they benefit to different extents from the same legal
regime). See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (immunizing online services from civil liability for
content posted by third parties).
Third, newspapers are coherent speech products in a way that social media
platforms are not. By affirmatively selecting the subjects and viewpoints that will
make it into the paper, newspapers communicate their own message to readers by
“combining multifarious voices.” Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569.13 Most social media
platforms are not coherent speech products because they are not curated in the same
granular way, and because they are simply too sprawling, diverse, and incoherent (in
the literal sense of the word) to be understandable as single expressive products.
Again, social media companies do set community standards that delineate the outer
boundaries of permissible speech on their platforms, and they do enforce these
community standards to one extent or another. But specifying and enforcing
community standards is not the same thing as selecting individual articles, and it
does not have the same results. This is why newspapers’ readers tend to attribute

13

See also Oren Bracha, The Folklore of Informationalism: The Case of Search
Engine Speech, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 1629, 1651 (2014) (describing newspapers as
producing “an integrated expressive whole with which [the newspaper] is
associated.”); Volokh, supra at 405 (describing newspapers as providing a “coherent
speech product”).
20
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newspapers’ content to the newspapers’ publishers, whereas platforms’ users do not
generally attribute the content on the platforms to the platforms’ owners.14
Fourth, newspapers generally do not remove content once it has been
published, whereas removing content after publication is a major part of social media
platforms’ operations. Newspapers do issue corrections and editors’ notes, but they
almost never take down content once it is published.15 Social media companies
devote immense resources to after-the-fact removal of content that violates their
community standards. Indeed, Facebook apparently employs 15,000 content
moderators, who review 3 million pieces of content each day to determine if any
should be removed.16
Finally, newspapers rely mainly on human decision-making in order to
moderate and curate content, whereas social media companies increasingly rely on

14

Bracha, supra at 1647-48; Genevieve Lakier, The Problem Isn’t the Use of
Analogies but the Analogies Courts Use, Knight First Amendment Institute at
Columbia University Blog (Feb. 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/WDT7-EY4J; Ramya
Krishnan, The Pitfalls of Platform Analogies in Reconsidering the Shape of the First
Amendment, Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University Blog (May
19, 2021), https://perma.cc/QHD8-7JLS.
15

Rogene Jacquette, We Stand Corrected: How The Times Handles Errors, N.Y.
Times (June 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/VY25-P5RP.
16

John Koetsier, Report: Facebook Makes 300,000 Content Moderation Mistakes
Every
Day,
Forbes
(June
9,
2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkoetsier/2020/06/09/300000-facebook-contentmoderation-mistakes-daily-report-says/?sh=d3fdd854d03d.
21

USCA11 Case: 21-12355

Date Filed: 11/15/2021

Page: 29 of 37

machine-learning algorithms that are generally opaque even to their creators.17 As a
consequence, newspapers’ decisions are explainable in a way that platforms’
decisions often are not.18
*****
These differences between social media companies and newspapers should
inform any First Amendment analysis. Some regulations that would burden editorial
judgment if imposed on newspapers might not burden editorial judgment if imposed
on social media companies. Even regulations that would burden social media
companies’ editorial judgment might not burden that judgment to the same extent as
they would burden newspapers’ editorial judgment if the regulations were imposed
on them. And the government may have different reasons, and perhaps stronger
ones, for imposing certain kinds of regulatory burdens on social media companies.
The analogy of social media companies to newspapers is helpful—but only to a

17

Deepa Seetharaman, The Facebook Files: Facebook Says AI Will Clean Up the
Platform. Its Own Engineers Have Doubts, Wall Street Journal (Oct. 17, 2021),
https://perma.cc/PCM8-BJD8; Lawrence Lessig, The First Amendment Does Not
Protect Replicants, Harv. Public Law Working Paper No. 21-34 (September 10,
2021), https://perma.cc/B29P-ATS2.
18

E.g., Anna Kramer, Twitter’s own research shows that it’s a megaphone for the
right. But it’s complicated, Protocol (Oct. 21, 2021) (“When algorithms get put out
into the world, what happens when people interact with it, we can’t model for that.
We can’t model for how individuals or groups of people will use Twitter, what will
happen in the world in a way that will impact how people use Twitter”),
https://perma.cc/4BZT-CKW4.
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point. The similarities between platforms and newspapers are important, but, in any
particular context, the differences might be important, too.19
E.

Construing platforms’ rights too broadly would impede
government from enacting laws that would serve First
Amendment values.

The protection that the Supreme Court has afforded to editorial judgment is
essential to our society. It recognizes and affirms the expressive autonomy of
individual speakers. It also serves as a crucial bulwark against government efforts to
distort and control public discourse—as this case reminds us. But giving editorial
judgment too broad a scope, or shielding it altogether from regulatory burden, would
be a mistake, especially in an era in which so much speech that is essential to our
democracy takes place on private platforms. Indeed, doing so would undermine
interests that the First Amendment was intended to protect.
For example, it would make it exceedingly difficult for the government to
address the challenges identified below, even through regulation that is carefully
drawn and sensitive to First Amendment interests:
Platform transparency. Social media platforms shape public discourse in a
variety of ways—including through their design choices, their community standards
and enforcement, and their content curation, including the algorithmic prioritization

19

See generally Whitney, supra.
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and deprioritization of user-generated content.20 Public understanding of how
platforms are shaping public discourse is very limited, however, for multiple
reasons. Platforms have declined to share information with researchers and the
public.21 Some platforms have leveraged their terms of service to interfere with
journalists and researchers who study issues like misinformation and discrimination
online.22 And because they rely on machine-learning algorithms that are black boxes
even to the engineers who designed them, the social media companies themselves
do not fully understand how their platforms work.23
In response to all of this, researchers, advocates, and regulators have proposed
that the platforms be required to share certain categories of information with
credentialed researchers or the public.24 The Knight Institute has proposed that

20

See generally Jameel Jaffer & Katy Glenn Bass, Opinion, Facebook’s ‘Supreme
Court’ Faces Its First Major Test, N.Y. Times (Feb. 17, 2021),
https://perma.cc/27K9-LPS2.
21

Laura Edelson, Opinion, How Facebook Hinders Misinformation Research,
Scientific American (Sept. 22, 2021), https://perma.cc/6V2Y-AGQ8.
22

Charlie Savage, Facebook Is Asked to Change Rules for Journalists and
Scholars, N.Y. Times (Aug. 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/BP3M-U4CN.
23

Kramer, supra.

24

See, e.g., The Disinformation Black Box: Researching Social Media Data:
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the H. Comm.
Sci., Space, and Tech. (2021) (statement of Laura Edelson, NYU Cybersecurity for
Democracy), https://science.house.gov/imo/media/doc/Edelson%20Testimony.pdf;
Shirin Ghaffary, How to fix Facebook: Can Facebook be redeemed? Twelve leading
experts share bold solutions to the company’s urgent problems, Vox (Nov. 8, 2021)
(interview with Professor Nathaniel Persily), https://perma.cc/YA54-NZG7.
24
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Congress create a legal safe harbor that would protect certain kinds of journalism
and research from interference by the platforms.25 Whether these proposals are
sensible, go too far, or fail to go far enough can be debated, of course. An overbroad
understanding of “editorial judgment,” however, would render this debate entirely
academic, because it would turn the First Amendment into a major obstacle to all of
these proposals. It would mandate the application of strict scrutiny where
intermediate scrutiny would be more appropriate. And it would mean that
regulations that might otherwise survive constitutional scrutiny would fail it instead.
Due process. When the government excludes a person from a traditional
public forum, like a school board meeting, it must explain why, and it must afford
the person an opportunity to challenge the exclusion. The same is true when the
government excludes a person from a social media account used for official
purposes. When a social media company excludes a user from its platform, by
contrast, it is not legally obliged to provide notice or an opportunity to be heard.26
Some scholars and legislators have proposed that platforms should be required to
provide users with due process, because being excluded from major social media

25

Ramya Krishnan & Alex Abdo, How Do You Solve A Problem Like Facebook?,
Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University Blog (Oct. 14, 2021),
https://perma.cc/MAG5-RJEJ.
26

See Oversight Board, Oversight Board demands more transparency from
Facebook (Oct. 2021), https://perma.cc/T4N7-R98K.
25
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platforms means being excluded from a large part of public discourse.27 Here, too,
there is room for debate about exactly what kinds of obligations should be imposed
on platforms—and Plaintiffs make a strong argument that the burdens associated
with the due process provisions of the Florida law are disproportionate in relation to
the government’s asserted justification for them. But even if Plaintiffs are correct, it
is important to recognize that due process protections might be implemented in other
ways, including in ways that are less burdensome. An overbroad conception of
editorial judgment, or an insistence that editorial judgment must be categorically
immunized from regulatory burden, or an unqualified endorsement of the equation
between platforms and newspapers, would render the whole debate beside the point.
It would make it nearly impossible for governments to establish due process
protections that are important to free speech online.
Privacy. Social media platforms collect staggeringly large amounts of
sensitive information about their users—and, indeed, about their non-users as well.
They use this information to target online advertisements and other content to
individual users.28 Targeting and “micro-targeting” can create echo chambers in
which misinformation and conspiracy theories sometimes flourish. It can also have

27

Volokh, supra at 403; Balkin, supra at 85; Ashutosh Bhagwat, Do Platforms
Have Editorial Rights?, 1 J. Free Speech L. 97, 126 (2021).
28

See, e.g., Natasha Singer, What You Don’t Know About How Facebook Uses
Your Data, N.Y. Times (April 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/3CJ6-HFF3.
26
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the effect of insulating speech from counterspeech and correction, effectively
undermining a process that the First Amendment was meant to safeguard. See
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Scholars,
advocates, and others have proposed that legislatures restrict what platforms can
collect about their users, and limit how the information they collect can be used.29
But the same is true in this context as is true in the two contexts addressed above: an
overly sweeping conception of platforms’ First Amendment rights would preempt
this legislative debate. It would disable legislatures from enacting laws that may be
important to protecting free speech online.
*****
It is worth emphasizing again that the protection the courts have accorded to
editorial discretion is essential. This protection has limits, however, and these limits
help ensure that the protection serves, rather than undermines, First Amendment
interests. The Court should not interpret the First Amendment in a way that would
preclude legislatures from enacting carefully drawn laws, sensitive to First
Amendment interests, that may be necessary to protect free speech online.

29

Farhad Manjoo, Opinion: OK, but What Should We Actually Do About
Facebook? I Asked the Experts, N.Y. Times (Nov. 4, 2021), https://perma.cc/3GSDWB72.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, amicus respectfully urges this Court to affirm.
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